Now, here’s a thing

Iran’s so far successful defence and counterstrikes against prolonged attacks by the US and Israel is paradigm-shifting in many ways. One of them is that it has moved low-cost, mass-produced uncrewed aerial and maritime vehicle systems to the centre of its defence strategy, writes Peter Donaldson. This strategy does not rely on an arsenal consisting entirely of these systems, rather it combines them with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and loitering munitions cued by a robust intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance network with a significant space-based element – some of it homegrown and some provided by friendly powers, principally Russia and China.

Notable by their absence from reports coming out of the combat zone are the high-end platforms traditionally considered essential by nations that regard themselves as significant military powers: fighter jets (with the exception at the time of writing of an F5 that reportedly bombed a US base in Kuwait), armoured vehicles, aircraft carriers, frigates and submarines. Iran either lacks these or simply isn’t using them – its response has been entirely asymmetric.

In operations against missile defences located in Israel and toward US military bases in Gulf Arab states and Iraq, Iranian Shahed-136 and other types of drones have been key players in the destruction or disabling of multiple ground-based radar sets and also an AWACS aircraft whilst on the ground. While US and Israeli missile defences may not have been completely blinded, warning times have been reduced drastically, making the job of interceptor missiles practically impossible.

Whether drones directly destroyed these radar systems or paved the way for their destruction by ballistic missiles through saturation of air defence networks and depletion of interceptor stocks is still subject to the fog of war to a degree, and the truth is likely to be a mixture of the two. Large, long-range radars in fixed sites are ideal targets for ballistic missiles, while smaller mobile sets are more suitable targets for drones because their powerful RF and IR emissions make them vulnerable to RF and IR seekers on UAVs that may be able to exploit terrain masking to avoid local ground-based air defences.

Marine uncrewed systems are just as vital to Iran’s defences, in particular to its control of the Strait of Hormuz. While its newly commissioned drone carrier IRIS Shahid Bahman Bagheri (C-110-4) was sunk in the first wave of US attacks in late February, the ‘Suicide Skiff’ fleet of numerous one-way strike USVs and the complementary fleet of torpedo-format UUVs have proved much harder to neutralise. These are intended to overwhelm the defences of larger conventional warships as well as target blockade-running merchant vessels. Both operate in conjunction with Iran’s ‘Mosquito Fleet’ of crewed, missile-armed speedboats that operate as strike assets, air defence platforms and command nodes for uncrewed systems.

A major element in the survivability of Iran’s drone and ballistic missile fleets is physical protection and concealment, with factories, arsenals and launch facilities in complexes built at depths under mountains beyond the reach of bunker-busting bombs or hidden in caves in cliffs along the country’s sheer and rugged coast. Choosing the right technologies to master and making intelligent use of geography has helped make Iran a very tough nut to crack, even for a superpower – a lesson that will not be lost on others around the world.